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Antitrust And The Future Of Cost
Containment Efforts in the Health
Profession
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent opinion, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soci-
ety,1 the United States Supreme Court decided that section 1 of
the Sherman Act 2 was "violated by an agreement among compet-
ing physicians setting, by majority vote, the maximum fees that
they may claim in full payment for health services provided to pol-
icy holders of specified insurance plans."3 The original complaint,
filed by the State of Arizona in October 1978, was directed against
two county medical societies 4 and two foundations for medical
care (FMC) organized by the societies.5 The State prayed for in-
junctive relief6 based on the theory that the defendants were en-
gaged in an illegal price fixing conspiracy. The district court
denied a state motion for summary judgment,7 but did certify for
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Indiana University.
1. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
2. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in pertinent part provides: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal." Act of July 2, 1890 (Sherman Act) § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976).
3. 102 S. Ct. at 2469.
4. After the defendants filed their answers one of the medical societies was dis-
missed by consent. Id.
5. For an explanation of FMC's and their interrelationships with medical socie-
ties, see infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
6. 102 S. Ct. at 2469 n.1.
7. Three reasons were cited by the district court for denying the motion for
summary judgment. First, it believed that "'a recent antitrust trend appears
to be emerging where the Rule of Reason is the preferred method of deter-
mining whether a particular practice is in violation of the antitrust law."' 102
S. Ct. at 2469 n.2 (quoting app. to petition for cert. at 43). Second, it did not
read the prior Supreme Court opinions invalidating maximum price-fixing,
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram &
Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951), as necessarily establishing a per se rule. Finally,
the court noted that "'a profession is involved here."' 102 S. Ct. at 2469 n.2
(quoting app. to petition for cert. at 45). Accordingly, the district court denied
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interlocutory appeal the question: "'whether the FMC member-
ship agreements, which contain the promises to abide by maxi-
mum fee schedules, are illegal per se under section 1 of the
Sherman Act."' 8 By a divided vote,9 the court of appeals' 0 af-
firmed the district court's order denying summary judgment. In a
4 to 3 opinion the Supreme Court reversed the lower court, finding
the maximum fee arrangement to be horizontal price-fixing and,
therefore, per se illegal."
As an aid to understanding the Maricopa County decision, this
Article will explore the economic environment of the health care
industry. It will examine the rampant cost escalation that plagues
the industry and explain how much of this inflationary surge is
the motion for summary judgment since there was insufficient evidence as to
the purpose and effect of the allegedly unlawful practices and the power of
the defendants to support such a motion under rule of reason analysis. Id.
(quoting app. to petition for cert. at 47).
8. 102 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d
553, 554 (9th Cir. 1980)).
An interlocutory order may be entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1976), which provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not other-
wise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is sub-
stantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate ap-
peal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination
of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court
of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be
taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days
after the entry of the order- Provided, however, That application for
an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court
unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof
shall so order.
On August 8, 1979, the district court entered an order providing:
'This Court's determination that the Rule of Reason approach
should be used in analyzing the challenged conduct in the instant
case to determine whether a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act has occurred involves a question of law as to which there is sub-
stantial ground for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal
from the Order denying plaintiff's motion for partial summary judg-
ment on the issue of liability may materially advance the ultimate
determination of the litigation. Therefore, the foregoing Order and
determination of the Court is certified for interlocutory appeal pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)."
102 S. Ct. at 2469 n.3 (quoting app. to petition for cert. at 50-51).
9. See infra notes 149-75 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court noted this
division stating that "each of the three judges on the panel had a different
view of the case." 102 S. Ct. at 2469.
10. 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980).
11. 102 S. Ct. at 2480. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority and was joined by
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall. Justice Powell filed a dissenting
opinion which was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnqulst.
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of the case.
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precipitated by a third party financing method which offers little
incentive to control costs. It will then trace the development of the
health maintenance organization (HMO), a device which has been
heralded as holding great promise for containing medical costs
without sacrificing quality health care. This background will inti-
mate that the FMC's under attack in Maricopa County were not
designed to contain costs but were actually anticompetitive
schemes designed to undermine the development of the more
promising HMO's.12
The Article will then pursue a three-pronged survey of the anti-
trust developments that lay the groundwork for the Court's inquiry
in Maricopa County. Initially, this will entail an examination of
the line of cases which extended the reach of the antitrust laws to
the professions in general13 and the health care profession in par-
ticular.14 Secondly, this part of the Article will focus on the judicial
construction of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's15 antitrust exemp-
tion for the "business of insurance."1 6 Finally, an overview will be
presented of the judicial fashioning of an appropriate standard of
review-a rule of reason or a per se rule-for cost containment ef-
forts which employ maximum fee schedules.
With this background, the Court's skepticism over the cost con-
tainment justification forwarded by the FMC's in Maricopa County
will be better understood. Analysis of the court of appeals and
Supreme Court decisions in Maricopa County, coupled with the
earlier economic discussion, should provide a useful guide for de-
termining both the effectiveness and legality of future cost contain-
ment efforts in the health care industry.
1. THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM-
BACKGROUND
A. Cost Escalation in the Health Care Industry
From April 1981 to April 1982 employment in the service indus-
tries surpassed the job total in the production sector for the first
time in the history of the American economy. Most of this surge
occurred in the consumer areas, with health services leading the
way with an increase of 235,000 jobs over the year. This raised the
total number of health service jobs to 5,717,000.17 Health care, pres-
12. See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
13. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See infra notes 71-86 and
accompanying text.
14. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738 (1976). See infra notes
87-90 and accompanying text.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1976).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a)-(b) (1976). See infra note 99.
17. Stetson, Service Industry Employment Surpasses Manufacturing, Blooming-
1983]
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ently both a major industry and a growth industry, 18 accounted for
only 3.6 percent of the gross national product (GNP) in 1929 when
total health expenditures were approximately $3.6 billion.19 In
1965 this had climbed to $43 billion or 6.2 percent of the GNP, and
by 1978 had reached $192 billion, or about 9.1 percent of the GNP.20
"Recent projections by the Health Care Financing Administration,
assuming no major institutional changes in the health sector, are
for 1990 health care expenditures of $758 billion representing 11.5
percent of the projected 1990 GNP."21
B. Market Failure-The Reasons for Soaring Medical Costs
Basically, the "rising medical care prices are the consequence
of demand increasing more rapidly than it can be accommodated
by supply .... This is not the whole story ... but it is a signifi-
cant part of the story."22 Part of this rising demand can be ex-
plained by the growth of the over sixty-five segment of the
population and our rising living standard which frees more and
more of our income for health care.2 3 However, more important
than either of these factors in explaining cost escalation in the
health industry is the shift in the way medical costs are financed
today.24
ton Herald-Telephone, July 14, 1982, at 15, col 1. For the decade ending in
1981, health service jobs rose by 2.1 million, or 63 percent. Id.
18. Feldman & Zeckhauser, Some Sober Thoughts on Health Care Regulation, in
REGULATING BUSINESS 93 (1978). In 1974, the health care industry assumed
the position as the third largest industry in the nation. See INSTrUE OF
MEDICINE, CONTROLS ON HEALTH CARE: PAPERS OF THE CONFERENCE ON REG-
ULATION IN THE HEALTH INDUSTRY 6 (1974).
19. M. FLETCHER, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 290 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as FLETCHER].
20. Drury & Enthoven, Competition and Health Care Costs, in THE ECONOMY IN
THE 1980s: A PROBLEM FOR GROWTH AND STABILrTY 393-94 (M. Boskin ed.
1980).
21. Id. at 394.
22. FLETCHER, supra note 19, at 290.
23. Id. "As our incomes go up, we spend more on medical services, both in abso-
lute terms and as a proportion of total income." Id.
24. [Today] bills are likely to be paid by some third party: a private
health insurance company or a government bureau or agency. Such
third party payments reached the level of half of all personal health
care expenditures for the first time in 1970. By fiscal 1975 these third
parties took the responsibility for paying over two-thirds of total
expenditures.
Id. at 291. Individuals were responsible for only 8 percent of total payments
in the case of hospital care costs. Id.
Health insurance took root during the Great Depression in the L930's.
"Between 1940 and 1972, fiscal intermediaries increased their population cov-
erage from 12 million to 182 million persons. . . ." Kallstrom, Health Care
[Vol. 62:49
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There is a broad consensus among health care policy experts that the
health care market does not behave competitively.... The principal cul-
prit is thought to be a deep-pocket, cost-based financing system that pro-
motes inefficiency in both the supply and consumption of health services
by removing the usual discipline of price competition.
2 5
In addition, conditions for a competitive market do not exist be-
cause "[h]ealth is not a neatly divisible commodity produced by
large numbers of competitors all adjusting prices and input mixes
to maximize profits. Doctors and hospitals have predominantly
captive clienteles, and may exercise substantial market power."26
Further, there are serious information problems in identifying
benefits because "[m]uch of what determines health remains a
mystery."2 7
While health care consumers may be concerned with rising
costs, they may not be willing to accept the fact that cost reduction
could very well entail a corresponding reduction in the resources
expended by the health care industry.28 In short, normal market
forces do not operate since no party is overly concerned with cost
control.29
Cost Control by Third Party Payors: Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act,
1978 DuKE L.J. 645, 674 n.121.
25. Millstein & Buc, Supreme Court Ruling Adds Fuel to Debate Over Health
Planning, The Nat'l L.J., July 13, 1981, at 26, col. 4. "In addition, due to the
technical nature of most health services, doctors rather than consumers
make most consumption decisions, and doctors' economic incentives are gen-
erally to utilize a greater, not a lesser, volume of health services." Id. Defen-
sive medicine, stemming from rampant malpractice suits, may also explain
doctors' motives toward increasing the services they prescribe. See Drury &
Enthoven, supra note 20, at 417.
26. Feldman & Zeckhauser, supra note 18, at 95. "Few appendicitis victims can
be trusted to shop around for the most economical hospital or surgeon." Id.
27. Id.
28. Note, Controlling Health Care Costs Through Commercial Insurance Compa-
nies, 1978 DuKE L.J. 728. "Consumers want their health services to be pro-
vided at more reasonable rates, but at the same time they expect to fully
benefit from all advances in health technology and to be given comprehensive
treatment." Id. at 728-29.
29. "For hospitals, the normal insurance mechanisms are cost reimbursement or
the third party payment of charges." Drury & Enthoven, supra note 20, at 398.
Physicians normally employ a fee-for-service system which requires insurers
to directly pay physicians for each service rendered. "To increase income, a
physician has only to provide more numerous or more costly services. There
is therefore a fairly strong incentive to do so, and certainly no economic in-
centive to be conservative." Id. at 397.
Distinguished British playwright, George Bernard Shaw, commenting on
the dilemma facing doctors under the fee-for-service arrangements, re-
marked. '"That any sane nation, having observed that you could provide for
the supply of bread by giving bakers a pecuniary interest in baking for you,
should go on to give a surgeon a pecuniary interest in cutting off your leg, is
enough to make one despair of political humanity." G. SHAw, THE DocTORs
DmmMA, act V (1942).
19831
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The customary practice in the medical industry is for doctors and hospi-
tals to submit bills and for insurance companies to pay them. Health care
costs are rising precipitously because under this customary practice there
are no incentives for restraint. Doctors, knowing that they will be paid
what they charge, have no incentive to control the amount and the price of
services. Insured patients are ineffective in limiting the care they receive;
aside from usually insignificant deductibles and coinsurance obligations
under their policies, all care is essentially "free" from their perspective. 30
Because at the time of purchase others share in the overall cost
of health care services, health care is a subsidized commodity.3 1 In
some instances the subsidy takes the form of government support
for the construction of health care facilities, purchase of equip-
ment, or the training of manpower. At other times, as with Medi-
care and Medicaid,32 the government directly pays for medical
care. For most people the major subsidy is fellow insureds partici-
pating in some collective health plan.33 A major motivation for the
soaring use of insurance by consumers is the tax deduction for
health insurance premiums34 and the exclusion from employees'
taxable income of whatever amount an employer contributes to-
ward health care premiums. 35 This latter fact makes premium
costs virtually invisible to the employee.3 6 Thus, when doctors in-
crease their prices for services, insurance companies pass the in-
crease on to employers in the form of higher premiums.
"Employers, in turn, allow health benefits to become a larger per-
centage of total employee compensation."37
30. Kallstrom, supra note 24, at 647. "[W] ith an estimated 80-90 percent of Amer-
icans having at least some public or private health insurance, and well over
half rather comprehensively covered, the medical care system has almost a
blank check for its services." McClure, The Medical Care System Under Na-
tional Health Insurance: Four Models, 1 J. HEALTH POL, PoL'Y & L. 22, 34
(1976). "In the long run, of course, insureds do pay for this care through
higher premiums, but it is irrational for any given patient to refrain from
drawing on the collective fund at the moment the utilization decision is made,
especially when nothing prevents others from exploiting the insurance fund."
Kallstrom, supra note 24, at 647-48. See FLETCHER, supra note 19, at 292.
31. See Feldman & Zeckhauser, supra note 18, at 96. 'This web of subsidies...
is a primary source of misallocation problems within the health care system
... 
" Id.
32. Enacted in 1965, Medicare covered 27 million elderly and disabled persons in
1978. Medicaid, a joint federal/state program which pays for the health care
of welfare recipients and other low income people, covered nearly 23 million
beneficiaries in 1978. Drury & Enthoven, supra note 20, at 396.
33. In 1979 the Congressional Budget Office estimated that in 1976, 92-95 percent
of the population had some form of health insurance. Id. at 397.
34. I.R.C. § 213 (West 1982).
35. I.R.C. § 106 (West 1982).
36. Drury & Enthoven, supra note 20, at 396.
37. Id. at 408. 'The tax treatment of health insurance premiums encourages em-
ployers and employees to use untaxed dollars to purchase group insurance
having low deductibles. This accessible and inviting market for first dollar
[Vol. 62:49
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Therefore, it has been acknowledged that "the rapid growth of
health care costs in this country has resulted from the increasing
separation between receipt of medical services and out-of-pocket
payment for them."38 In short, there is not economic competition
in the health care industry.
It is true that services are provided predominantly in the private sector
and that there are multiple independent producers. But the existence of
public and private insurance removes consideration of cost from virtually
all of the relevant transactions in this industry. With no'consciousness of
cost, there can be no economic competition 3 9
C. Cost Containment Strategies
Two fundamental approaches can be pursued to introduce cost
containment into the health care industry: "by government fiat...
or by adjusting private market incentives."40 Political solutions to
the current cost escalation dilemma face serious obstacles. First,
the health care system has been described as reflecting "an uneasy
balance between the tradition of intense economic individualism
inherited from the past and the current need for a broad social ap-
proach to health care problems."41 However, up to this point, "the
demand for individual freedom for both consumers and providers
of health care services weigh[ed] far more heavily in the balance
than [did] any concern for an adequate overall social policy."42
Second, it has been suggested that "governmental efforts to grap-
ple with costs directly through regulation have reflected a concern
for a symptom of the health care system's underlying problems
rather than a desire to find and address root causes."43 Accord-
coverage has provided no real incentive to innovate with seemingly less at-
tractive coverages." Note, supra note 28, at 729.
38. Schwartz, Introduction to NEW DIECTIONS iN PuBUc HEALTH CARE: A PRE-
SCRIUrON FOR THE 1980s 5 (C. Lindsay ed. 1980).
39. Drury & Enthoven, supra note 20, at 407 (emphasis in original).
40. Kalistrom, supra note 24, at 648.
41. FLETcHER, supra note 19, at 296.
42. Id.
[Thus,] it is not surprising that we have a medical care system which
is highly technical, disease-oriented rather than health oriented,
largely fragmented and uncoordinated, and which uses methods of
organization which often seem to be based on private gain rather
than on the most effective or efficient attainment of the public good.
Greifnger & Sidel, American Medicine, 18 ENV'T 16 (1976).
This result is certainly consistent with political and economic realities.
'"There is no natural constituency for... [reforms] and they face difficult
political obstacles. The burden of rising health care costs is spread through
every industry and across both the public and private sectors. Organizations
that represent physicians and hospitals would prefer to maintain the status
quo." Drury & Enthoven, supra note 20, at 415.
43. Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing,
1978 DuKE L.J. 303, 304.
1983]
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ingly, some commentators have recommended a market approach,
singling out the third party payors as the likely initiators of needed
reform since "[g] iven the chance to run their natural courses, mar-
ket incentives should draw insurance companies into the business
of offering cost containment as a service to health care
consumers."4
Traditionally, there have been two basic types of third party
payors that might assume the lead in cost containment efforts:
Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans and the private commercial car-
riers.45 The Blue service plans originated as creatures of the
health care providers46 and it has been cautioned that "[a] lthough
provider control has become attenuated, it still exists in some
plans."47 Typically, the Blues "reimburse hospitals for their costs
and physicians for their reasonable professional charges, as deter-
mined under a 'usual, customary and reasonable fee' formula
(UCRF)."48 This method of reimbursement seems to encourage
doctors to raise their "usual" charges to the maximum reimburs-
able level, then to collectively raise their "customary" fees when
the UCRF schedule is recomputed.4 9 "Thus, Blue Shield plans,
even though in a position to control costs because of their contrac-
tual relationship with providers, may have in fact contributed to
cost escalation."5 0
Fee schedules implemented by the private commercial carriers
should be contrasted "with the less defensible 'usual, customary
and reasonable fee' approach traditionally employed by Blue
Shield service plans."5 ' The private carriers have not been per-
44. Kallstrom, supra note 24, at 649. This is because "[ujnder the present sys-
tem, only the third party payor has any immediate incentive to control costs."
Id. at 648.
45. Id. at 649. Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans are non-profit, tax-exempt orga-
nizations which contract directly with health care providers in order to obtain
services required by their subscribers. The private carriers do not deal di-
rectly with providers; instead, they contract with their subscribers to indem-
nify them for their medical expenses. About 40% of the insurance population
is now covered by the Blues. Id. at 649-50.
46. Blue Cross is an offspring of the hospital associations while Blue Shield was
created by the state medical societies. Id. at 650.
47. Id.
48. Id. 'Thus, the Blue Shield plans usually agree to pay participating physi-
cians their 'usual' fee up to a stated percentile of the range of fees that are
'customary' for a particular procedure in the area, with 'reasonable' increases
if there are complications." Id.
49. Id. "Although obstensably [sic] serving as a maximum price ceiling, the
UCRF could thus easily become a minimum price floor and could allow doc-
tors, with only casual collusion, to racket costs upward each time the UCRF
schedule is revised." Id.
50. Id. at 650-51.
51. Id. at 646.
[Vol. 62:49
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ceived as having been tainted by a close link with the providers as
have the Blues. 52 Accordingly, fee schedules imposed as cost con-
trol agreements between single private insurers and single health
care providers may "be effective in combating the price escalation
that now plagues the third party payment system."53
Other advocates of a market solution to the cost escalation
problem have warned that "[a]s long as the [health care] market
is structured around individual services, it will be difficult to intro-
duce economic restraints."5 They believe that the development of
HIMO's offers greater promise of reform since "[a] better notion of
product around which to create an economically competitive mar-
ket is that of comprehensive care."55 HIMO's, "a small but viable
sector of the medical economy ... are potentially significant vehi-
cles for controlling health care costs."5 6 HMO's both insure and
provide health care to a population of voluntarily enrolled mem-
bers. Structurally, they possess certain characteristics which are
conducive to cost containment:
First, the iMOs' distinctive integration of insurance and provider func-
tions results in an organization operating with a budget that is largely
fixed in advance. This creates much stronger incentives to deliver serv-
ices economically than any that exist in the fee-for-service sector, and in
fact certain well-established HMOs have shown a marked ability to reduce
substantially the total costs of medical care to consumers. HMOs also
may encourage more comprehensive and integrated provision of services
in order to take advantage of economies of scale and of integration.5 7
52. See supra notes 45 & 46.
53. Kallstrom, supra note 24, at 646. Several explanations have been presented
as to why the fiscal intermediary may wish to impose price ceilings on provid-
ers. "First and foremost, controlling medical cost inflation could reverse the
pattern of financial loss that has plagued many health insurance plans for a
number of years." Id. at 648 n.9. Second, by efficiently reducing costs, the
third party payor "could expect to capture a larger segment of the health in-
surance market by reducing the price of his coverage to consumers below
that of his competition." Id. Third, by aggressively containing costs, the in-
surance industry could place the pressure of health care inflation on "those
best able to prevent cost increases-the hospitals and the doctors." Id. "Fi-
nally, a cost control program would make medical insurance plans more con-
sistent with the standard and sensible insurance practice of seeking to
restrict payouts." Id.
54. Drury & Enthoven, supra note 20, at 408.
55. Id. at 409.
56. Kissam, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Role of Antitrust Law,
1978 DuKE LJ. 487,488. In 1965 there were an estimated 20 HIMO's serving 1.5
million people. By 1978 those numbers had increased to 170 organizations
with an enrollment in excess of 6 million people. Id. at 488 n.2.
57. Kissam, supra note 56, at 490. See McNeil & Schlenker, HMOs, Competition
and Government, 53 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 195, 200-01 (1975).
"HMOs are financed by capitation payments for individuals or families,
and their physicians are salaried. Providers thus are discouraged from offer-
ing medical care of doubtful or marginal value, and are encouraged to supply
1983]
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By making both patients and providers more cost conscious, 58
the HMO's are in sharp contrast to the traditional financing pro-
grams which have been utilized in the medical profession. The
traditional financing programs "have systematically fostered the
demand-stimulating effects of third-party payment and foreclosed
experimentation with ways of offsetting those effects." 59 Accord-
ingly, these characteristics have made the HMO's a threat to the
fee-for-service providers and insurers. Thus, organized medicine
initially reacted to the development of these institutions by con-
demning them as a form of unethical medical practice.60 Lately,
however, the attack on HMO's has been more subtle; providers
have adopted the HMO form in a preemptive or defensive manner
to "deter entry by or to discipline more aggressive, independently-
sponsored I-MOs."61
Defensive HMO's are frequently in the form of the foundations
for medical care (FMC) that are established by county medical so-
cieties in the areas where HMO's are likely to develop.62 Generally
open to participation by all physician members of the initiating
medical society, the FMC's reimburse participating physicians on
a fee-for-service basis. "This organizational form differs dramati-
cally from the closed-panel HMO, which typically employs physi-
cians on a salaried or profit-sharing basis and provides its services
in physically integrated group practice facilities."63
The FMC's participants are usually required to accept certain
controls over their practice-particularly, maximum fee schedules
more cost-effective care." Feldman & Zeckhauser, supra note 18, at 103. They
"set their price prospectively. This completely changes the incentives found
in the traditional system .... The financing and service functions are
merged in a single organization. The cost consequences of the decisions
made by an organization's providers are fully reflected in their prospective
fee." Drury & Enthoven, supra note 20, at 409.
58. "Patients can select an... [HMOI at a time when they are not in immediate
need of services, when they can evaluate the philosophy and propensities of
competing organizations against their costs. In other words, in such a market
patients can exercise economic judgment." Drury & Enthoven, supra note 20,
at 409 (emphasis added).
59. Havighurst, supra note 43, at 306.
60. Kissam, supra note 56, at 492. HMO's were also said to provide unreasonable
competition for physicians. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United
States, 130 F.2d 233, 238-40 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1942), af'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). This
claim may not be entirely without merit. "HIOs' particular financial incen-
tives arguably could produce certain kinds of over-economizing that are dam-
aging to patients." Kissam, supra note 56, at 492.
61. Kissam, supra note 56, at 491.
62. Id. at 492 n.19. Two other common forms of defensive HMO's also exist. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield plans may create programs designed to protect their
sizeable market shares. Also, a dominant hospital in a small city might initi-
ate such a plan to service a selected population. Id.
63. Id.
[Vol. 62:49
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and peer review.6 4 Where the FMC's "are arms of large, multi-mar-
ket 'monopolies' such as Blue Cross or state medical societies,
there may be particular incentives for them to engage in predatory
pricing or promotion against an individual HMO trying to enter a
single market."65 Further, if the maximum prices become the min-
imum price, price competition will likely cease to exist.66
Accordingly, the FMC's are subject to attack on several fronts.
First, "[a]lthough FMCs are a step in the right direction where
they are effective, they may be seen ... as mild half-measures
compared to the independent initiatives they preempt-both inde-
pendently operated HMOs and insurance plans having their own
cost-containment machinery."67 Second, the use of maximum fee
schedules and other forms of price control or communication
among health care providers subjects those involved to potential
antitrust liability.68
I. ANTITRUST AND COST CONTAINMENT EFFORTS
While "there are powerful reasons why certain kinds of fee
schedules are desirable in the insurance context,"69 such arrange-
ments may be found to violate the Sherman Act's proscription
against unreasonable restraints of trade.70 The Supreme Court
has made clear its commitment to enforcing the antitrust laws.7 1
For example, in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
64. This is the very type of organization and controls that were the subject of the
judicial inquiry in Maricopa County. See infra notes 137-48 and accompany-
ing text.
65. Kissam, supra note 56, at 491. "Defensive HMOs are likely to set their premi-
ums at entry limiting levels and to recruit aggressively only among those
groups that are most likely to be attracted to competitive HMOs." Id.
66. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. at 2474-75 (quoting
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968)). Maximum price schedules
may be acceptable if they are administered individually by private insurance
carriers.
[A] ntitrust policy objects not merely to fixed minimum, but also to
maximum prices when they are established by concerned profes-
sionals, and even when the period of fix is relatively short. However,
where those with economic interests adverse to the profession's are
in a position to control the schedule, antitrust objections are
obviated.
Kallstrom, supra note 24, at 678.
67. Havighurst, supra note 43, at 315-16.
68. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
69. Kallstrom, supra note 24, at 664. 'They contribute to the predictability of
risks and thereby permit lower premiums." Id. at 664-65.
70. See supra note 2.
71. "Congress 'exercis[ed] all the power it possessed' under the Commerce
Clause when it approved the Sherman Act." California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 111 (1980) (quoting Atlantic
Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932)).
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Co. ,72 the Court stated "that Congress, exercising the full extent of
its constitutional power, sought to establish a regime of competi-
tion as the fundamental principle governing commerce in this
country."7 3 In sweeping language, the Court has also stressed:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation
of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights
is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the free-
dom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the free-
dom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and
ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.7 4
Due to their inherent anticompetitive tendencies concerted ef-
forts to promote cost containment in the health care industry must
be carefully implemented, lest they run afoul of the antitrust laws.
Proponents of cost containment measures have historically identi-
fied three strategies for avoiding antitrust liability. First, they have
attempted to convince the courts that there is an implied antitrust
exemption for the professions.7 5 Second, they have claimed to be
within the antitrust exemption for the "business of insurance."7 6
Finally, they have called for the application of a rule of reason
standard for maximum price schedules designed to promote cost
control in the health profession.77
A. Implied Antitrust Exemptions For Professional Activity
The antitrust laws, "created for and.., developed in an envi-
ronment of commercial competition.., have not, as of yet, been
applied extensively to the field of medicine."78 Early decisions by
72. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). Rejecting a claim that the insurance business was not
within the purview of the Sherman Act, the Court in United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), stated: "Language more compre-
hensive is difficult to conceive. On its face it shows a carefully studied at-
tempt to bring within the Act every person engaged in business whose
activities might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among the
states." Id. at 553.
73. 435 U.S. at 398. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-35 (1948).
74. United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
75. See infra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 115-33 and accompanying text.
78. Horan & Nord, Application of Antitrust Law to the Health Care Delivery Sys-
tern, 9 CUmBERLAND L. REV. 685 (1979).
The antitrust laws exist in order to promote the abstract standard of
societal benefit through unrestrained competition and cannot, in the
foreseeable future, be expected to evolve to a state of compatibility
with many of the existing practices in the health care delivery sys-
tem. The present efforts to apply the antitrust laws to health care
providers are part of a calculated plan to bring about fundamental
changes in the operation of the health care delivery system.
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the United States Supreme Court indicated that medicine, as well
as the other professions, might enjoy an implied exemption from
the Sherman Act.7 9 However, in 1975, with the resolution of Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar,80 the Court extended the reach of the
antitrust laws to the anticompetitive activities of the professions.
In Goldfarb, the Court was called upon to decide "whether a
minimum fee schedule for lawyers published by the Fairfax
County Bar Association and enforced by the Virginia State Bar vi-
olate [d] § 1 of the Sherman Act... ."81 Resting on its perception
of a history of judicial recognition of an implied exclusion from an-
titrust for the "learned professions," the court of appeals had de-
cided against liability, holding that the practice of law is not "trade
or commerce."8 2 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
stating that "[t] he nature of an occupation, standing alone, does
not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act ... "83 It empha-
sized that "the public-service aspect of professional practice [is
not] controlling in determining whether § 1 includes profes-
sions."8 4 The Court stressed that, "[i]n the modern world ... the
activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial inter-
course, and . . [the] anticompetitive activities by lawyers may
exert a restraint on commerce."8 5 In opening the door of antitrust
enforcement to professional activities, the Court did offer one
limitation:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from
a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular
restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the
practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities,
and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which
originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of
the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could prop-
erly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be
treated differently.86
Soon after the Goldfarb Court held that professional activities
were "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act,
Id.
79. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 490 (1950);
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932); FTC v.
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931); Federal Club v. National League, 259
U.S. 200, 209 (1922). But see, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States,
317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943).
80. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
81. Id. at 775.
82. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 13 (4th Cir. 1974).
83. 421 U.S. at 787 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945)).
84. 421 U.S. at 787 (citing United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339
U.S. 485, 489 (1950)).
85. 421 U.S. at 788.
86. Id. at 788-89 n.17.
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the Court further eroded the jurisdictional barrier which sheltered
the health care professions from antitrust constraints. Originally,
activities were within the reach of the Act if they occurred in or in
the flow of interstate commerce.8 7 This jurisdictional prerequisite
was widened to include health activities that materially affect in-
terstate commerce in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hos-
pital.88 Rex Hospital involved a proprietary hospital's suit against
a competing not-for-profit hospital. Allegedly the not-for-profit
hospital conspired to prevent the proprietary hospital from ob-
taining governmental approval to relocate and expand its facility.
In rejecting the argument that the provision of hospital and medi-
cal services is "strictly a local intra-state business,"89 the Court
held that, taken together, the hospital's interstate purchases of
medical supplies, its revenues from out-of-state insurance compa-
nies, its management fees paid to its out-of-state parent, and the
out-of-state financing it procured for its new facility established a
substantial impact on interstate commerce.9 0
Goldfarb and Rex Hospital greatly increased the susceptibility
of the health care profession to antitrust liability. After these two
decisions, a profession seeking to escape antitrust liability must
show that its anticompetitive activities "'serve the purpose for
which the profession exists, viz. to serve the public. That is, it
must contribute directly to improving service to the public. Those
which only suppress competition between practitioners will fail to
survive the [antitrust] challenge.' "91
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,92
the Court made its first post-Goldfarb inquiry into the anticom-
petitive activities of a professional organization. While supporting
Goldfarb's denial of an implied antitrust exemption for the profes-
sions, Professional Engineers did concede that anticompetitive
professional practices might be examined under the rule of reason
analysis. However, it cautioned that only procompetitive justifica-
tions would support such acts.93
87. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 201-02 (1974); Mandeville
Island Farms Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-33 (1948).
88. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
89. Id. at 742.
90. Id. at 744. Rex Hospital illustrates the Sherman Act's expanding reach under
the "affectation doctrine" of the Commerce Clause. "If it is interstate com-
merce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which
applies the squeeze." United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336
U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
91. Horan & Nord, supra note 78, at 699 (quoting Boddicker v. Arizona State Den-
tal Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1977)).
92. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
93. Id. at 692. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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Professional Engineers involved a civil antitrust case brought
by the United States
to nullify an association's canon of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding
by its members. The question ... [was] whether the canon may be justi-
fied under the Sherman Act ... because it was adopted by ... a learned
profession for the purpose of minimizing the risk that competition would
produce inferior engineering work endangering the public safety.94
While recognizing Goldfarb's intimation that certain professional
restraints might survive antitrust scrutiny, even though they
would violate the laws in another context,9 5 the Court still rejected
the Society's justification for its anticompetitive ban on bidding.
The Court explained:
There are ... two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the
first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so
plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed
to establish their illegality-they are "illegal per se." In the second cate-
gory are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by
analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint,
and the reasons why it was imposed. In either event, the purpose of the
analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the
restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the
public interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry ....
[T] hat policy decision has been made by the Congress. 96
Describing price as the "central nervous system of the economy,"19
Professional Engineers held that "an agreement that 'interfere [s]
with the setting of price by free market forces is illegal on its
face.' "98
B. An Antitrust Exemption for the "Business of Insurance"
After the Court's refusal to imply an antitrust exemption for the
professions, health care insurers and providers hoped to find shel-
ter from the rigors of antitrust under the McCarran-Ferguson Act's
exemption for the "business of insurance."99 Because of the con-
94. 435 U.S. at 681.
95. Id. at 686. See supra text accompanying note 86.
96. 435 U.S. at 692. "Contrary to its name, the Rule [of Reason] does not open the
field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint
that may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the
challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions." Id. at 688.
97. 435 U.S. at 692. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum ORl Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226
n.59 (1940).
98. 435 U.S. at 692 (quoting United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 33, 337
(1969)). "While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis
is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agree-
ment." 435 U.S. at 692.
99. Act of Mar. 9, 1945 (McCarren-Ferguson Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1976). The
Act provides in part-
[§ 1012] (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged
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gressional commitment to a free enterprise system, 0 0 the
Supreme Court has consistently held that exemptions from anti-
trust must be construed narrowly.1 01 Accordingly, it has narrowed
the "business of insurance" exemption, identifying three criteria
relevant in determining if a particular practice qualifies for the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act's antitrust shelter. 'first, whether the prac-
tice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policy holder's
risk second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third,
whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance
industry." 0 2
Using this constricted view, the Court concluded there was no
exemption in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug
Co.103 That case involved a Blue Shield policy which attempted to
control the cost of prescription drugs. If an insured selected a par-
ticipating pharmacy-one which had entered into a "Pharmacy
Agreement"-he was required to pay only $2 for every prescription
drug. The remainder of the cost would be paid directly to the par-
ticipating pharmacy by Blue Shield.104 In Royal Drug the Court
carefully noted that the only issue before it was
whether the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that the Phar-
macy Agreements are not the "business of insurance" within the meaning
of... the McCarran-Ferguson Act. If that conclusion is correct, then the
Agreements are not exempt from examination under the antitrust laws.
Whether the Agreements are illegal under the antitrust laws is an entirely
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which
relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
[§ 1012] (b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, im-
pair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, ... unless such Act specifi-
cally relates to the business of insurance ....
[§ 1013] (b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the...
Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or
intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1012(a)-(b), 1013(b) (1976).
100. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Standard Oil Co.
v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951).
101. Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425 U.S. 1 (1976); Con-
nell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); Federal Mari-
time Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973); United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
102. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. 3002, 3009 (1982) (citing Group
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979)).
103. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
104. Id. at 209. Since Blue Shield would only reimburse the participating phar-
macy for its cost of acquiring the drug, "only pharmacies that ... [could]
afford to distribute prescription drugs for less than... [the] $2 markup...
[could] profitably participate in the plan." Id.
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separate question .... 105
Finding the program at issue in Royal Drug to evidence none of
the criteria essential to a finding of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's
applicability,O6 the Supreme Court denied it an antitrust exemp-
tion, explaining that "[t] he exemption is for the 'business of insur-
ance,' not the 'business of insurers.' "107
Last year, in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno,108 the
Court again examined the "business of insurance" exemption and
denied its application to an alleged conspiracy to eliminate price
competition among chiropractors. The program in Pireno involved
the use of a "peer review committee" composed of practitioners
that advised insurance companies as to whether particular treat-
ments and fees were "necessary" and "reasonable." In denying
the exemption, the Court stressed that the criteria relevant to the
exemption 09 were not satisfied1l0 and expressed particular con-
cern that the program threatened to restrain competition in non-
insurance markets."'
Like Royal Drug,112 Pireno emphasized that "[t]he only issue
before us is whether petitioners' peer review practices are exempt
from antitrust scrutiny as part of the 'business of insurance.' . ..
Thus in deciding this case we have no occasion to address the mer-
its of respondent's Sherman Act claims."" 3
Royal Drug and Pireno demonstrate the Supreme Court's con-
striction of the "business of insurance" exemption. Coupled with
Goldfarb's denial of a general antitrust exemption for profes-
sions-a view reinforced by Professional Engineers-and Rex Hos-
pital's recognition of an expanding reach for the Sherman Act,
cost containment reformers were forced to shift their efforts to-
105. Id. at 210.
106. See supra text accompanying note 102.
107. 440 U.S. at 211. In narrowly construing the insurance exemption the Court
stated: "If agreements between an insurer and retail pharmacists are the
'business of insurance' because they reduce the insurer's costs, then so are
all other agreements insurers may make to keep their costs under control-
whether with automobile body repair shops or landlords." Id. at 232.
108. 102 S. Ct. 3002 (1982).
109. See supra text accompanying note 102.
110. 102 S. Ct. 3002, 3009-10.
111. Id. at 3010. "[T]he practices retrain competition in a provider market-the
market for chiropractic services-rather than in an insurance market." Id. at
3011.
112. See supra text accompanying note 105.
113. 102 S. Ct. at 3007. Criticizing the Pireno decision, Justice Rehnquist com-
plained that "[a]lthough the Court protests that its decision says nothing
about petitioners' antitrust liability, there can be little doubt that today's de-
cision will vastly curtail the peer review process. Few professionals or com-
panies will be willing to expose themselves to possible antitrust liability
through such activity." Id. at 3014 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ward convincing the judiciary that health care restraints are prop-
erly scrutinized under a rule of reason analysis." 4
C. Maximum Fee Schedules: Rule of Reason v. Per Se Analysis
Since most health care cost containment programs involve
agreements to control fees-generally maximum fee schedules-
the Court has had to determine if the usual per se rule against
price fixing applies to such programs. It has been asserted that
"[pIrice fixing... should not escape per se condemnation simply
because ... [it] enjoy[s] the respectability of having been man-
dated by the ethical rules of a given profession."" 5
This conflict between per se or rule of reason analysis has been
thrust to the forefront in the judicial controversy surrounding cost
containment efforts in the health field. Judge Hand offered strong
support for an open approach in antitrust analysis when he wrote:
[A]s everyone now agrees.. . restriction alone is not enough to stamp a
combination as illegal; it must be "unreasonable" in the sense that the
common law understood that word; and that never has been, and indeed
in the nature of things never can be, defined in general terms. Courts
must proceed step by step, applying retroactively the standard proper for
each situation as it comes up, just as they do in the case of negligence,
reasonable notice, and the like.1 16
Furthermore, the Court has cautioned against too hasty an appli-
cation of per se rules, stressing that their "advantages are not suffi-
cient in themselves to justify the creation of per se rules. If it were
otherwise, all of antitrust law would be reduced to per se rules,
thus introducing an unintended and undesired rigidity in the
law."" 7 Despite these convincing arguments for rule of reason
analysis, the judiciary has simultaneously recognized the impor-
tance of per se rules since "[o]nce established, . . . [they] tend to
provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the
burden on litigants and the judicial system of the more complex
rule-of-reason trials."118 Indeed maximum fee schedule cases have
historically been accorded per se treatment. For example, in
114. This movement was fueled by Professional Engineer's interpretation of the
Goldfarb decision. See supra text accompanying notes 86 & 93-95.
115. Note, The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes: Applicability of Per Se
Rules Under the Sherman Act, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 387, 413 (1978). "In...
[this case], courts should not hesitate to pierce the veil of professional self-
regulation during their inquiries into noncommercial purpose." Id.
116. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd,
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
117. 433 U.S. at 50 n.16.
118. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977). "Per se
rules are perceived as promoting values not only of judicial economy but also
of certainty and prophylaxis." Note, supra note 115, at 391.
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Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,119 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the notion that "'[u] nder the Sherman
Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a
commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.' "120
The case arose after several liquor producers agreed to sell liquor
only to wholesalers who would resell at prices fixed by the produ-
cers. The Court assessed per se liability because "agreements
among competitors to fix maximum resale prices... no less than
those to fix minimum prices, crippled the freedom of traders and
thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own
judgrnent."'21
Seventeen years later, the Supreme Court, in Albrecht v. Herald
Co.,122 reaffirmed Kiefer-Stewart's logic. In Albrecht the Court
found the Sherman Act to proscribe, under its per se standard, a
newspaper's program of issuing exclusive territories and terminat-
ing carriers whose prices exceeded its suggested maximum. Citing
Kiefer-Stewart, Justice White's majority opinion emphasized that
the Court had previously rejected the view that setting maximum
prices constituted no restraint on trade.123 Noting the long ac-
cepted rule that resale price fixing is a per se violation of the
law,124 Albrecht held "that the combination formed.., to force pe-
titioner to maintain a specified price for the resale of newspapers
... constituted, without more, an illegal restraint of trade .... 1125
In the majority's view,
[m]aximum and minimum price fixing may have different consequences
in many situations. But schemes to fix maximum prices, by substituting
the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the competi-
tive market, may severefy intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete
and survive in the market. Competition, even in a single product, is not
cast in a single mold. Maximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer
to furnish services essential to the value which goods have for the con-
sumer or to furnish services and conveniences which consumers desire
and for which they are willing to pay. Maximum price fixing may channel
distribution through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers who
otherwise would be subject to significant nonprice competition.12 6
119. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
120. Id. at 213 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223
(1940)).
121. 340 U.S. at 213.
122. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
123. Id. at 152.
124. 390 U.S. at 151. See United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305
(1956); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
125. 390 U.S. at 153.
126. Id. at 152-53. In a stinging dissent, Justice Harlan complained that "to con-
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This judicial proscription against all price fixing continued until
1979, when the Court appeared to relax its position that all price
fixing arrangements-minimum or maximum-were per se illegal.
The case, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem,127 involved an antitrust challenge to the blanket license
scheme utilized by American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). The li-
censing procedure was designed to overcome the fact that "as a
practical matter it was impossible for the many individual copy-
right owners [of music] to negotiate with and license the users and
to detect unauthorized uses."'128 Members of ASCAP grant the so-
ciety the nonexclusive rights to license performances of their
works, and ASCAP issues licenses and distributes royalties to the
copyright owners. BMI, owned by members of the broadcast in-
dustry, operates in a similar manner. By selling blanket licenses,
these organizations give the licensees the right to perform any and
all of the music for a stated period of time. The fees for a blanket
license are usually either a percentage of total revenues or a flat
clude that no acceptable justification for fixing maximum prices can be found
simply because there is no acceptable justification for fixing minimum prices
is to substitute blindness for analysis." Id. at 157 (Harlan, J., dissenting). He
explained that "[r] esale price maintenance... lessens horizontal intrabrand
competition. The effects, higher prices, less efficient use of resources, and an
easier life for resellers, are the same whether the price maintenance policy
takes the form of a horizontal conspiracy among resellers or of vertical dicta-
tion by a manufacturer plus reseller acquiescence." Id. Thus, he concluded
that it was possible to infer a combination of resellers since "it is the resellers
and not the manufacturer who reap the direct benefits of the policy." Id. Ver-
tically imposed price ceilings were, in Harlan's view, an entirely different
matter. "Other things being equal, a manufacturer would like to restrict
those distributing his product to the lowest feasible profit margin, for in this
way he achieves the lowest overall price to the public and the largest vol-
ume." Id. at 157-58. In dictating a price ceiling, "he [(the manufacturer)] is
acting directly in his own interest, and there is no room for the inference that
he is merely a mechanism for accomplishing anticompetitive purposes of his
customers [(resellers)]." Id. at 158. Justice Harlan went on to explain:
The per se treatment of price maintenance is justified because analy-
sis alone, without the burden of a trial in each individual case, dem-
onstrates that price floors are invariably harmful on balance. Price
ceilings are a different matter they do not lessen horizontal competi-
tion; they drive prices toward the level that would be set by intense
competition, and they cannot go below this level unless the manufac-
turer who dictates them and the customer who accepts them have
both miscalculated. Since price ceilings reflect the manufacturer's
view that there is insuffficient competition to drive prices down to a
competitive level, they have the arguable justification that they pre-
vent retailers or wholesalers from reaping monopoly or supercom-
petitive profits.
Id. at 159.
127. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
128. Id. at 5.
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amount. Prior to this lawsuit Columbia Broadcasting System
(CBS) held blanket licenses from both groups.129 CBS contended
that the licensing system constituted price fixing and a tying ar-
rangement, both per se unlawful under the Sherman Act.13 0 In de-
nying relief to CBS, the Court explained: "We have never
examined a practice like this one before .... And though there
has been rather intensive antitrust scrutiny of ASCAP and its
blanket licenses, that experience hardly counsels that we should
outlaw the blanket license as a per se restraint of trade."''1
Broadcast Music rang sweet to the ears of commentators who
have cautioned against too hasty an application of per se liability
to professions with which the Court is not familiar. "[U]ntil the
'business and economic stuff of a given profession's activities have
been reduced to predictable patterns, ad hoc determinations...
are preferable to the unchecked extension of per se rules into this
new area of the courts' antitrust jurisdiction."132 The Court in
Broadcast Music had adopted this approach, forsaking the per se
approach until it was better acquainted with the practices of the
music industry.133
This was the background from which Maricopa County arose.
With cost escalation in the health care industry running rampant,
it was suggested that costs could be brought under control only
through programs which made providers and users more cost con-
scious. Numerous commentators argued that among the free mar-
ket alternatives, only enforcement of fee schedules by private
insurers 34 and the development of closed-panel HMO's135 had any
real hope of containing costs. Therefore, the development of open-
panel FMC's, like those at issue in Maricopa County, was received
with some skepticism. They were perceived as conspiracies
designed to undermine the effectiveness of the more promising al-
ternatives. Accordingly, "[ilt. .. [was] argued that vigorous en-
forcement of the antitrust laws against . . . [these] concerted
actions taken by physicians with respect to health care financing
could significantly improve the climate for private cost-contain-
ment initiatives."' 36 Accepting the Court's reluctance to exempt
anticompetitive activities from the Sherman Act, the FMC's were
forced to rest their defense on the hope that Broadcast Music her-
129. Id.
130. Id. at 4-6.
131. Id. at 10.
132. Note, supra note 115, at 416 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
133. See supra text accompanying note 131.
134. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
136. Havighurst, supra note 43, at 305.
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alded the rule of reason approach to maximum fee schedules in
the health profession.
IV. ARIZONA v. MARICOPA COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY:
PER SE ANALYSIS FOR MAXIMUM FEE
SCHEDULES IMPLEMENTED BY
DEFENSIVE HMO's
A. Factual Background
The FMC's involved in Maricopa County were not-for-profit
corporations licensed as "insurance administrators"13 7 by the
State of Arizona.138 Organized "for the purpose of promoting fee-
for-service medicine and to provide the community with a competi-
tive alternative to existing health insurance plans,"139 the FMC's
performed three basic functions:
[They] establish[ed] the schedule for maximum fees that participating
doctors agree[d] to accept as payment in full for services performed for
patients insured under plans approved by the foundation [s]. [They] ...
review[ed] the medical necessity and appropriateness of treatment pro-
vided by ... [their] members to . . . insured persons. [They were] ...
authorized to draw checks on insurance company accounts to pay doctors
for services performed for covered patients. 1 4 °
The FMC's claimed that their price fixing "subserv[ed] a gen-
eral purpose of setting minimum standards and performing peer
review and administrative tasks for health insurance plans."141 In
137. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 554 (9th Cir. 1980).
Originally the defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that they were
engaged in the "business of insurance" and were therefore exempted from
the proscriptions of the Sherman Act by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. For a
discussion of the "business of insurance" exemption, see supra notes 99-114
and accompanying text. This motion was denied since "the agreements be-
tween physicians participating in the foundation-approved plans.., spread
no risk peculiar to the business of insurance." 643 F.2d at 559 n.7 (quoting
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, No. CIV-78-800 PHX WPC (D.
Ariz. June 11, 1979)). The defendants did not appeal this portion of the order.
102 S. Ct. 2466, 2469 n.2 (1982).
138. 643 F.2d at 554. The Maricopa Foundation for Medical Care is composed of
licensed doctors of medicine, osteopathy, and podiatry engaged in private
practice. It numbered approximately 1,750 doctors-about 70 percent of the
practitioners in Maricopa County. 102 S. Ct. at 2470. The Pima Foundation
for Medical Care included 400 member doctors-representing somewhere be-
tween 30 to 80 percent of the Pima County doctors. Id. at 2471 n.8. The two
FMC's in the case have been described as "exemplify[ing] a type of organiza-
tion that is beginning to play a significant part in the health services market."
643 F.2d at 554. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
139. 102 S. Ct. at 2470.
140. Id. at 2470-71. It was emphasized that "participating doctors ... have no
financial interest in the operation of the foundation." Id. at 2471.
141. 643 F.2d at 555. "No challenge is made to their peer review or claim adminis-
tration functions. Nor do the foundations allege that these two activities
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compiling the fee schedules the foundations made use of "relative
values" and "conversion factors." 4 2 When periodically revising
the fee schedules, "[t] he foundation board of trustees would solicit
advice from various medical societies about the need for change in
either relative values or conversion factors in their respective spe-
cialties. The board would then formulate the new fee schedule and
submit it to the vote of the entire membership."' 43
Insurers' 44 obtained foundation approval only after they agreed
to pay all of the doctors' charges up to the scheduled maximum. In
turn, the doctors agreed to accept the amounts as payment in full
for their services. However, "[t] he doctors... [remained] free to
charge higher fees to uninsured patients and they also... [could]
charge any patient less than the scheduled maxima."' 45
Some dispute existed over the precise impact of the fee sched-
make it necessary for them to engage in the practice of establishing maxi-
mum fee schedules." 102 S. Ct. at 2471. See also supra text accompanying
note 140. The state contended that the fee schedules were not inseparable
from the professional standards review of the foundations, noting that "the
foundations offer peer review and administrative services for at least one
health program-the foster child program-in which prices paid the doctors
are not set by themselves but by the third party payor." 643 F.2d at 555.
142. 102 S. Ct. at 2471.
The conversion factor is the dollar amount used to determine fees for
a particular medical specialty. Thus, for example, the conversion fac-
tors for "medicine" and "laboratory" were $8.00 and $5.50, respec-
tively, in 1972, and $10.00 and $6.50 in 1974. The relative value
schedule provides a numerical weight for each different medical
service-thus, an office consultation has a lesser value than a home
visit. The relative value was multiplied by the conversion factor to
determine the maximum fee.
Id. Relative value scales have been challenged in the past by both the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Justice Department as price fixing devices.
See United States v. Illinois Podiatry Soc'y, Inc., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
61,767 (N.D. 11l. 1977) (consent decree); United States v. Alameda County Vet-
erinary Medical Ass'n, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,738 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (con-
sent decree); American College of Radiology, 89 F.T.C. 144 (1977) (consent
decree); American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 88 F.T.C. 968 (1976)
(consent decree); American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 88
F.T.C. 955 (1976) (consent decree).
143. 102 S. Ct. at 2471.
144. Seven insurance companies underwrote health plans approved by the Mari-
copa foundation and three companies participated with the Pima foundation.
Id. at 2471 n.11.
145. Id. at 2471. Thus,
[a] patient who is insured by a foundation-endorsed plan is guaran-
teed complete coverage for the full amount of his medical bills only if
he is treated by a foundation member. He is free to go to a nonmem-
ber physician and is still covered for charges that do not exceed the
maximum fee schedule, but he must pay any excess that the non-
member physician may charge.
Id. at 2471-72.
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ules on medical fees and insurance premiums. The state argued
that the schedules raised members' fees above the average and
median fees charged by Arizona doctors. It contended that "the
periodic upward revisions of the maximum fee schedules ...
[had] the effect of stabilizing and enhancing the level of actual
charges by physicians, and that the increasing level of their fees in
turn increase [d] insurance premiums."' 46 Contesting the appro-
priateness of the statewide figures used for comparison,147 the
foundations
argue[d] that the schedules impose a meaningful limit on physicians'
charges, and that the advance agreement by the doctors to accept the
maxima enables the insurance carriers to limit and to calculate more effi-
ciently the risks they underwrite and therefore serves as an effective cost
containment mechanism that has saved patients and insurers millions of
dollars. 14 8
B. The Court of Appeals
The court of appeals stated that "the challenged practice...
[was] not a per se violation."' 49 However, the fact that a restraint
may appear reasonable is not controlling: "The key ...is the
agreement's impact on competition. If competition is promoted
the agreement passes muster; if it suppresses or destroys competi-
tion it does not." 50 The court was concerned that the record re-
vealed nothing about the redeeming virtues or competitive harms
of the challenged arrangement.' 5 ' Additionally, the court was "un-
certain about the competitive order that should exist within the
health care industry pursuant to the Sherman Act as interpreted
by the courts."' 52 Finally, since the "present supply and demand
146. Id. at 2472.
147. 643 F.2d at 555. The foundations did "concede that eighty-five to ninety-five
percent of physicians in Maricopa County bill at or above the maximum reim-
bursement levels set by the county FMC." Id. See 102 S. Ct. at 2471 n.10.
148. 102 S. Ct. at 2472. "[T] he Attorneys General of 40 different States, as well as
the Solicitor General of the United States and certain organizations repre-
senting consumers of medical services, have filed amicus curiae briefs sup-
porting the State of Arizona's position on the merits .... " Id.
149. 643 F.2d at 560.
150. Id. at 556. Restraints proscribed by the Sherman Act may be "'based either
(1) on the nature and character of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding cir-
cumstances giving rise to the inference or presumption that they were in-
tended to restrain trade and enhance prices."' Id. (quoting National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978)). See supra text
accompanying notes 92-93.
151. 643 F.2d at 556. "In truth, we know very little about the impact of this and
many other arrangements within the health care industry. This alone should
make us reluctant to invoke a per se rule with respect to the challenged ar-
rangement." Id.
152. Id. The opinion noted that professions had only recently been brought
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functions of medical services in no way approximate those which
would exist in a purely private competitive order... , [the court]
lack[ed] baselines by which could be measured the distance be-
tween the present supply and demand functions and those which
would exist under ideal competitive conditions."15 3 For these rea-
sons, per se liability was not imposed.
The court said the issue was "whether fees paid to doctors
under... [the] system [as it exists] would be less than those pay-
able under the FMC maximum fee agreement." 5 4 Therefore, it did
not believe that it could properly invoke per se liability unless it
could assume that "the FMCs are but devices to enable member
doctors to capture a greater share of potential monopoly profit,
which their monopoly power makes available, than otherwise
would be possible."155 The court of appeals was not prepared to
make that assumption. Recognizing "that economic motives fre-
quently lie behind even the best of good works,"156 and that the fee
schedules could well be contrary to antitrust principles, 5 7 the
court asserted that "[t] o affix the per se label to appellees' conduct
... [would] substitute an unsupported belief for proper proof.' 58
within the reach of the Sherman Act. Id. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975). For a discussion of Goldfarb, see supra text accompany-
ig notes 81-86.
153. 643 F.2d at 556. Judge Sneed writing for the Court of Appeals recognized that
it was particularly difficult to determine the competitive order that should
exist within the health care industry. Essential to such an understanding is
the realization that access to the profession is time consuming and expensive
for both the applicants and society. Also, "numerous government subven-
tions of the costs of medical care have created both a demand and supply
function for medical services that is artificially high." Id. See supra notes 31-
37 and accompanying text.
154. 643 F.2d at 556. Thus, the issue was whether the fee schedules enhanced
prices: "In simplified economic terms, the issue is whether the maximum fee
arrangement better permits the attainment of the monopolist's goal, viz., the
matching of marginal cost to marginal revenue, or in fact obstructs that end."
Id.
155. Id. at 557.
156. Id.
157. Id. On two separate occasions the Supreme Court has found maximum re-
sale price arrangements to constitute per se violations of the Sherman Act.
See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). For a discussion of these cases, see
supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text. Judge Sneed argued, however,
that "[tihis circuit has not extended those rulings to horizontal agreements
that establish maximum prices." 643 F.2d at 557 n.4. "It can hardly be said
... that a per se rule forbidding horizontal maximum price agreements is
well settled." Id. He did imply that if the exchange of price information in-
volved in the arrangement was found to raise or maintain prices, it might well
violate the Sherman Act. Id. at 557. See Maple Flooring Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
158. 643 F.2d at 557. Responding to the charge that the schedules violated the
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Responding to the state's assertion that joint action "tam-
per[ing] with price structures" automatically offends antitrust,6 9
the court of appeals cited Broadcast Music as having held that
minimum price fixing in the market for copyrighted music was not
per se unlawful.160
Being unable to evaluate the competitive aspects of any feature
of the total structure of the health care profession, the majority
was opposed to a per se standard. "Here the novelty of the market
or markets and the inadequacy of the record make an inquiry into
the affected areas of competition essential."' 6 1 In reaching this
conclusion the court drew comfort from the Supreme Court's rec-
ognition of a fundamental distinction between the professions and
traditional commercial entities:
[M]arketing restraints that regulate professional competition may pass
muster under the Rule of Reason even though similar restraints on ordi-
nary business competition would not. We believe this recognizes that a
restraint may serve the public, the transcendent end of all professions,
even though its presence in a purely commercial setting would violate the
antitrust law.
16 2
Judge Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the court
lacked "experience in judging the maximum reimbursement
schedules" to brand them per se violations of the Sherman Act.163
Noting that the antitrust laws may have a different application in a
Sherman Act because they were designed to forestall government price con-
trols that might force prices down to a lower level, Judge Sneed stressed-
To eschew profit maximization in order to forestall price control is
neither irrational nor, under the facts of this record, in violation of
the Act. We observe in passing that only a government lost in an
impenetrable legal maze, after having contributed substantially to
the creation of monopoly conditions, would threaten price control if
full monopoly profits are reaped and enforcement of the antitrust
laws if private means are used to prevent the harvest.
Id.
159. Id. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
160. 643 F.2d at 557. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
441 U.S. 1, 9 & n.14 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 127-33.
161. 643 F.2d at 558 n.5. The court of appeals was uncertain as to the competition
between and among FMC's, insurance carriers, hospitals, and HMO's. It
noted that "[w]hen a questioned business practice affects more than one
sphere of competition, the Rule of Reason of course recognizes that the en-
hancement of competition in one sphere may offset the weakening of compe-
tition in another." Id. See First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 612
F.2d 1164, 1170 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980).
162. 643 F.2d at 560. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. at 696 & n.22; Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17; Bod-
dicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977).
163. 643 F.2d at 560 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "'It is only after considerable expe-
rience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se
violations ... ."' Id. (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S.
596, 607-08 (1972)).
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professional setting,164 Judge Kennedy reiterated that "[p]er se
rules should be derived from considerations of economic impact in
particular cases illustrating the category of prohibited acts, and
therefore a trial is appropriate to explore further the impact on
competition of the challenged reimbursement schedules."165
In a strong dissent, Judge Larson would have measured the
standard of liability by a three step inquiry. First, he would ask if
this was the type of "'naked price restraint' "166 which had previ-
ously been adjudged per se illegal. "If so, then only some peculiar-
ity of the health care industry can justify application of a lesser
standard."' 67 He believed that formulation and dispersal of the
relative value guides and conversion factor lists168 clearly consti-
tuted illegal price fixing,169 and he could "find nothing in the na-
ture of either the medical profession or the health care industry
that would warrant their exemption from per se rules for price-
fixing."170
164. See supra text accompanying note 86 & 92-95.
165. 643 F.2d at 560 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
This is not to suggest, however, that I have found these reimburse-
ment schedules to be per se proper, that an examination of these
practices under the rule of reason at trial will not reveal the pro-
scribed adverse effect on competition, or that this court is foreclosed
at some later date, when it has more evidence, from concluding that
such schedules do constitute per se violations.
Id.
166. Id. at 563 (Larson, J., dissenting).
167. Id. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 347 (1963).
168. See supra note 142.
169. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951); Kartell v. Blue Shield of
Mass., Inc., 592 F.2d 1191, 1193 n.2 (1st Cir. 1979); Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375
F.2d 273, 274, 276-78 (1st Cir.), cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 801 (1967); Crane Dis-
tributing Co v. Glenmore Distilleries, 267 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1959); Vander-
velde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Assoc., 344 F. Supp. 118, 134 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
170. 643 F.2d at 564 (Larson, J., dissenting). The dissent read the Supreme Court's
decision in National Society of Professional Engineers as holding that "when
the nature and character of an agreement among professionals is plainly an-
ticompetitive, no extended analysis is necessary to find it forbidden under
the Sherman Act." 643 F.2d at 564 (Larson, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
" [c] ommentators have suggested that the commercial aspects of the profes-
sions, including medicine, should be subject to customary per se rules." Id.
See Horan & Nord, supra note 78, at 700; Weller, Medicaid Boycotts & Other
Maladies from Medical Monopolists, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 99, 104 (1977);
Note, supra note 115, at 399 & n.36, 414-15.
Judge Larson interpreted the fee schedule arrangement as having "a
wholly commercial nature ... [that] has no relation to any public service
aspect of the medical profession. . . " 643 F.2d at 565 (Larson, J., dissent-
ing). He recognized that Congress was aware of the special problems of the
health care industry. See STAFF OF PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF
SENATE GOVERN. AFFAIRS Comm., 96TH CONG., IST SESS., CALIFORNIA RELATIVE
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Second, if the conduct was not the type traditionally found to be
per se illegal, Larson would inquire if "it possess [es] such harmful
features that it should now be declared per se illegal." 7 1 Judge
Larson was persuaded that "[t]he entire system is designed to
avoid providing anyone with an incentive to control costs."1 72 This
led him to conclude that "[e ] ven if this were the first judicial ex-
amination of this form of restraint, its anticompetitive vices are
egregious and its procompetitive features nonexistent, so that this
Court could declare it to be within the per se rules."'7 3
Finally, Judge Larson noted that, "if the rule of reason must be
applied,... the practice [was] so plainly anticompetitive that
only a truncated rule of reason analysis need be carried out.' 7 4 He
clearly did not subscribe to the majority's cautious approach, be-
lieving that "even if the rule of reason is the correct standard by
which to judge . . . [the foundations'] activities, a detailed eco-
nomic analysis of the industry is not necessary. This agreement to
VALUE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW (Staff Study 1979); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ON BLUE SHIELD
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS (Comm. Print 1978); Skyrocketing Health Care Costs.
The Role of Blue Shield: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Inves-
tigation of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978); Competition in the Health Service Market (pts. 1-3): Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). He emphasized that "[t]he policy decision
that competition is in the public interest has been made by Congress ...
[and] [oInly Congress can declare that health care is to be exempted from
this mandate." 643 F.2d at 566 (Larson, J., dissenting).
171. 643 F.2d at 563 (Larson, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc., v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 n.33 (1979).
172. 643 F.2d at 567 (Larson, J., dissenting). Citing Albrecht, 390 U.S. 145, 152
(1968), Judge Larson listed three harms that resulted from the program's
maximum fee setting provision:
[E]limination of the freedom of individual sellers and buyers to de-
termine prices, the possibility that the "maximum" price is in reality
being used to establish a price floor or price uniformity, and the use
of a maximum price structure to inhibit entry of competing forms of
health care delivery which might capture a significant market share
and deflect income from traditional fee-for-service physicians [are
harms which result from maximum fee setting].
643 F.2d at 567 (Larson, J., dissenting).
173. 643 F.2d at 567 (Larson, J., dissenting). Civil liability under the Sherman Act
may be based on the finding of either an unlawful purpose or an anticompeti-
tive effect. McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978). "De-
fendants' purpose here was to fix prices and to suppress competition. These
are per se unlawful purposes. It may not be necessary to assess the actual
competitive effects of the controverted behavior where the unlawful purpose
is clear." 643 F.2d at 567 n.12 (Larson, J., dissenting).
174. 643 F.2d at 563 (Larson, J., dissenting). See, e.g., National Soc'y of Profes-
sional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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fix fees is so plainly anticompetitive that it is an unreasonable re-
straint of trade on its face."175
C. The Supreme Court
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the FMC's con-
ceded that past decisions had established that price fixing agree-
ments were unlawful on their face.176 However, in Maricopa
County the FMC's stressed "that the per se rule does not govern
this case because the agreements at issue are horizontal and fix
maximum prices, are among members of a profession, are in an
industry with which the judiciary has little antitrust experience,
and are alleged to have procompetitive justifications." 77
In reversing the court of appeals, Justice Stevens, writing for a
majority of four,178 recognized that despite the Sherman Act's pro-
scription of "every agreement 'in restraint of trade'. . , Congress
could not have intended a literal interpretation of the word 'every'
.... 179 Instead, in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States,180 the Supreme Court devised a rule of reason analysis.
"As its name suggests, the rule of reason requires the fact finder to
decide whether under all the circumstances of the case the restric-
tive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competi-
tion.'1 Many problems often plague the rule of reason analysis
including the litigation being extensive and complex,182 judges not
175. 643 F.2d at 569 (Larson, J., dissenting). "In light of the total absence of real
incentives for any of the plan's participants to limit fees, it is misleading to
suggest that a redeeming virtue of the maximum fee schedule is cost con-
trol." Id. at 568.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 119-26.
177. 102 S. Ct. at 2472.
178. See supra note 11.
179. 102 S. Ct. at 2472 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)) (emphasis original). For the
text of section 1 of the Sherman Act, see supra note 2.
180. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
181. 102 S. Ct. at 2472. Justice Brandeis explained the rule of reason test in Chi-
cago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condi-
tion before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the re-
straint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reasons for adopting the particular rem-
edy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant factors.
This is not because good intention will save an otherwise objectiona-
ble regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may
help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id. at 238.
182. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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always competently understanding market structures and behav-
ior,183 and the result of the analysis not providing a clearcut con-
clusion as to the legality of a practice. 8 4 Thus, the Court
recognized a need for per se liability when "experience with a par-
ticular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confi-
dence that the rule of reason will condemn it."185
Accordingly, the majority believed that "inquiry under its rule
of reason ended once a price fixing agreement was proved, for
there was 'a conclusive presumption which brought [such agree-
ments] within the statute.' "186 Citing Kiefer-Stewart, Justice Ste-
vens noted that this per se rule for price fixing also extended to
maximum price fixing agreements since "'such agreements, no
less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of trad-
ers and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with
their own judgment."' 87 Reminding the Court that this view was
reaffirmed in Albrecht,8 8 Justice Stevens made clear that the
Court had not in any way wavered in its enforcement of the per se
rules against price fixing.189
183. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972).
184. Id. at 609 n.10; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 5.
185. 102 S. Ct. at 2473.
"Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations
about the social utility of particular commercial practices. The
probability that anticompetitive consequences will result from a
practice and the severity of those consequences must be balanced
against its procompetitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the
generalization may arise, but a per se rule reflects the judgment that
such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the
time and expense necessary to identify them."
Id. at 2473 n.16 (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 50 n.16 (1977)).
186. 102 S. Ct. at 2473 (quoting Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
65 (1911) (brackets original). "The power to fix prices, whether reasonably
exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and
unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may through eco-
nomic and business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow."
Id. at 2473 (quoting United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397
(1927)).
"[F]or over forty years this Court has consistently and without
deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are
unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-
called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were
designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense."
102 S. Ct. at 2474 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 218 (1940)).
187. 102 S. Ct. at 2474 (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
340 U.S. 211, 213). See supra text accompanying note 121. But see Justice
Harlan's dissent in Albrecht, supra note 126.
188. 102 S. Ct. at 2474-75. See supra text accompanying note 122.
189. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (holding that a
horizontal agreement among competitors to fix credit terms contravened the
[Vol. 62:49
ANTITRUST
In Maricopa County, the majority condemned the foundations'
program as
a price restraint that tends to provide the same economic rewards to all
practitioners regardless of their skill, their experience, their training, or
their willingness to employ innovative and difficult procedures in individ-
ual cases. Such a restraint may discourage entry into the market and may
deter experimentation and new developments by individual
entrepreneurs. 19 0
It was unimpressed that doctors-rather than nonprofessionals-
were the parties to the restraint. Goldfarb's language reserving a
special inquiry for the "public service aspect[s], and other fea-
tures of the professions"191 was held inappropriate since "[t]he
price fixing agreements in this case ... are not premised on public
service or ethical norms."'192
Justice Stevens was equally unpersuaded by the argument that
rule of reason analysis was appropriate in light of the judiciary's
inexperience with the problems of the health care industry. 193 He
believed such a proposition was inconsistent with Socony-Vac-
uum's holding that" '[w] hatever may be its peculiar problems and
characteristics, the Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements
are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to all in-
Sherman Act). "The per se rule 'is grounded on faith in price competition as
a market force [and not] on a policy of low selling prices at the price of elimi-
nating competition."' 102 S. Ct. at 2475 (quoting Rahl, Price Competition and
the Price Fixing Rule--Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U.L REv. 137, 142
(1962) (brackets original)).
190. 102 S. Ct. at 2475. "It may be a masquerade for an agreement to fix uniform
prices, or it may in the future take on that character." Id.
191. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 788 n.17. See supra text accompa-
nying note 86.
192. 102 S. Ct. at 2475.
The respondents' claim for relief from the per se rule is simply that
the doctors' agreement not to charge certain insureds more than a
fixed price facilitates the successful marketing of an attractive insur-
ance plan. But the claim that the price restraint will make it easier
for customers to pay does not distinguish the medical profession
from any other provider of goods or services.
Id. at 2475-76.
193. Id. at 2476. The majority stressed that its position was not inconsistent with
"the established position that a new per se rule is not justified until the judici-
ary obtains considerable rule of reason experience with the particular type of
restraint challenged." Id. at 2476 n.19. See White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 253 (1963). The four justices constituting the majority in Maricopa
County believed that the Court already was sufficiently experienced with
price fixing restraints. Further, the majority opinion was careful to indicate
that it was not undermining its earlier decision permitting rule of reason
analysis for vertical non-price restraints in Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Syl-
vania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 102 S. Ct. at 2476 n.19.
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dustries alike.' "194 He did not believe that the per se rule should
be rejustified for every industry. Thus he explained that the un-
derlying rationale for the per se approach-avoiding "'the neces-
sity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved... in
an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has
been unreasonable' "'195-would be undermined by the founda-
tions' approach. Accordingly, he labeled the foundations' "princi-
pal argument... that the per se rule is inapplicable because their
agreements are alleged to have procompetitive justifications" 196 as
a misunderstanding of the per se concept. He emphasized that
"[the anticompetitive potential inherent in all price fixing agree-
ments justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive jus-
tifications are offered for some."1 97
Describing its refusal to extend rule of reason analysis to the
program as being grounded not only on "economic prediction, judi-
cial convenience, and business certainty, but also on a recognition
of the respective roles of the Judiciary, and the Congress in regu-
lating the economy"l9g the majority acknowledged that the Court,
due to the general nature of the antitrust laws, was required to
'provide much of [the] . . . substantive content" in their enforce-
ment. 99 At the same time, however, it believed that "[b]y articu-
lating the rules of law with some clarity and by adhering to rules
that are justified in their general application, . . . [it] enhance[d]
the legislative prerogative to amend the law."200 Thus, the
Supreme Court agreed with Judge Larson's dissent,201 holding that
"[tihe respondents' arguments against application of the per se
rule in this case ... are better directed to the legislature. Con-
194. 102 S. Ct. at 2476 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at
222).
195. 102 S. Ct. at 2476-77 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958)).
196. 102 S. Ct. at 2477.
197. Id. However, the majority, questioning procompetitive aspects of the ar-
rangement, stressed that "[elven if a fee schedule is... desirable, it is not
necessary that the doctors do the price fixing." Id. This opinion, as the ma-
jority made clear, did not answer the question of "whether an in.urer may,
consistent with the Sherman Act, fix the fee schedule and enter into bilateral
contracts with individual doctors." Id. at 2477-78 n.26 (emphasis added).
That question was also not reached in Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal
Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) (denying an antitrust exemption to insurer ad-
ministered maximum fee schedules). See supra notes 103-07 and accompany-
ing text.
198. 102 S. Ct. at 2478. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611-12
(1972).
199. 102 S. Ct. at 2478.
200. Id.
201. See supra note 170.
[Vol. 62:49
ANTITRUST
gress may consider the exception that we are not free to read into
the statute."202
Justice Stevens, finding Broadcast Music fundamentally differ-
ent from the instant case,203 did suggest that the former opinion
might support favorable treatment for closed-panel HMO's. He de-
scribed Broadcast Music as dealing with a product (the "blanket
license") which "was entirely different from the product that any
one composer was able to sell by himself."204 Although a neces-
sary consequence of the blanket license program was that a price
had to be established, Justice Stevens explained that it constituted
"price fixing only in a 'literal sense.' "205 He distinguished this
from Maricopa County where "[t] he members of the foundations
sell medical services ... [and] [t]heir combination in the form of
the foundation does not permit them to sell any different prod-
uct. '206 Offering some promise to HMO's, the Maricopa County
majority suggested that "[i] f a clinic offered complete medical cov-
erage for a flat fee, the cooperating doctors would have the type of
partnership arrangement in which a price fixing agreement among
the doctors would be perfectly proper."2 07
Justice Powell, in a strong dissent joined by the Chief Justice
and Justice Rehnquist, did "not think [the] . . .decision on an in-
complete record... [was] consistent with proper judicial resolu-
tion of an issue of this complexity, novelty, and importance to the
public."208 Initially, he criticized the result since "the foundation
202. 102S. Ct. at 2478-79. "'[Congress] can, of course, make perse rules inapplica-
ble in some or all cases, and leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of
economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach."' Id. at 2479 n.30
(quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972)).
203. Justice Stevens interpreted Broadcast Music as holding "that the delegation
by the composers to ASCAP of the power to fix the price for ... [a] blanket
license was not a species of the price fixing agreements categorically forbid-
den by the Sherman Act." 102 S. Ct. at 2479. See supra notes 127-33 and ac-
companying text.
204. 102 S. Ct. at 2479. "Thus, to the extent the blanket license is a different prod-
uct, ASCAP is not really a joint sales agency offering the individual goods of
many sellers, but is a separate seller offering its blanket license, of which the
individual compositions are raw materials.' Id. at 2479 n.31 (quoting Broad-
way Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 41 U.S. 1, 22 (1979)).
205. 102 S. Ct. at 2479.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2480. Such a venture would be beyond the reach of section 1 of the
Sherman Act since a "partnership is regarded as a single firm competing with
other sellers in the market." Id. Section 1 only proscribes joint activity in
restraint of trade. "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or man-
ufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion. . . ." United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,307
(1919).
208. 102 S. Ct. at 2480 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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arrangement foreclose[d] no competition."209 The dissent com-
plained that the majority overlooked the procompetitive impact of
the plan on consumer interests. "To keep insurance premiums at a
competitive level and to remain profitable, insurers-including
those who have contracts with the foundations-step into the con-
sumer's shoes with his incentive to contain medical costs."2 10 Rec-
ognizing that as an appeal of a plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, "the inferences to be drawn from the record must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the respondents," 21n the dis-
senters concluded that the plan benefitted consumers by "'en-
abl[ing] the insurance carriers to limit and to calculate more
efficiently the risks they underwrite.' "212
The dissent conceded that once an arrangement has been la-
beled as price fixing it is per se unlawful; however, drawing on
Broadcast Music, it reminded the majority that "it is equally well
settled that this characterization is not to be applied as a talisman
to every arrangement that involves a literal fixing of prices."213
Thus, it cautioned the Court that an arrangement is not to be char-
acterized as per se price fixing unless it is a "'naked restrain[t] of
trade with no purpose except stifling competition,' "214 which re-
209. Id. at 2481 (emphasis original).
[P]hysicians who participate in the foundation plan are free both to
associate with other medical insurance plans-at any fee level...-
and directly to serve uninsured patients-at any fee level .... Simi-
larly, insurers that participate in the foundation plan also remain at
liberty to do business outside the plan with any physician-founda-
tion member or not-at any fee level.
Id.
210. Id. at 2482. "Indeed, insurers may be the only parties who have the effective
power to restrain medical costs, given the difficulty that patients experience
in comparing price and quality for a professional service such as medical
care." Id. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
211. 102 S. Ct. at 2481 (Powell, J., dissenting). See United States v. Diebold, Inc.,
369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
212. 102 S. Ct. at 2482 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority's opinion at
2472). Justice Powell thus criticized the majority since, "even though the
case is here on an incomplete summary judgment record, the Court conclu-
sively draws . . . inferences [contrary to the record] to support its per se
judgment." Id.
213. Id.
The inquiry in an antitrust case is not simply one of "determining
whether two or more potential competitors have literally Tixed' a
'price'. . . . [Rather], it is necessary to characterize the challenged
conduct as falling within or without that category of behavior to
which we apply the label 'per se price fixing.' That will often, but not
always, be a simpler matter."
Id. (brackets original) (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing System, 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)).
214. Id. (brackets original) (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S.
596, 608 (1972), quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
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quires the Court to "determine whether the procompetitive econo-
mies that the arrangement purportedly makes possible are
substantial and realizable in the absence of such an agreement. '215
Accordingly,Ahe dissent would not have employed the per se stan-
dard without such an inquiry "especially... when the agreement
under attack is novel, as in this case. '2 16
Justice Powell was taken aback by the majority's suggestion
that the foundations' arguments against application of the per se
standard are more appropriately directed at the legislature. 217
This is curious advice. The Sherman Act does not mention per se rules.
And it was not Congress that decided Broadcast Music and the other rele-
vant cases. Since the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, it has been
the duty of courts to interpret and apply its general mandate-and to do so
for the benefit of consumers.2 18
Further, he was concerned that the majority failed to appreciate
that "[m] edical services differ[ed] from the typical service or com-
mercial product at issue in an antitrust case. '2 19 Thus, Justice
Powell did not believe that the conventional "perfect market" anti-
trust analysis was readily applicable to the uniqueness of medical
services. In any event, he certainly would not have condemned it
on a per se basis,220 stressing instead that "[i]n a complex econ-
(1963)). See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50
(1977). "Such a determination is necessary because 'departure from the rule-
of-reason standard must be based upon a demonstrable economic effect
rather than ... upon formalistic line drawing."' 102 S. Ct. at 2482 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Continental T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 58-59).
215. 102 S. Ct. at 2482 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell cited Professional,
Engineers, see supra text accompanying notes 89-93, as reinforcing this view.
See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 685,
693 (1978). Cf. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 646 n.8, 649-50
(1980). Further, he noted that in Broadcast Music, despite the existence of
minimum price fixing in the "literal sense," 441 U.S. at 8, the Court rejected
per se liability since the scheme "yielded substantial efficiencies that other-
wise could not be realized." 102 S. Ct. at 2483 (Powell, J., dissenting). But see
supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
216. 102 S. Ct. at 2483 (Powell, J., dissenting). Criticizing the majority's attempt to
distinguish Broadcast Music, see supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text,
Justice Powell observed that "[e]ach [of the two agreements] involved com-
petitors and resulted in cooperative pricing. Each arrangement also was
prompted by the need for better service to the consumers. And each arrange-
ment apparently makes possible a new product by reaping otherwise unat-
tainable efficiencies." Id. at 2484.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
218. 102 S. Ct. at 2484 (Powell, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 2485 n.13. 'The services of physicians, rendered on a patient-by-patient
basis, rarely can be compared by the recipient." Id.
220. Id.
Affirmance of the district court's holding would not have immunized
the medical service plan at issue. Nor would it have foreclosed an
eventual conclusion on the remand that the arrangement should be
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omy, complex economic arrangements are commonplace. It is un-
wise for the Court, in a case as novel and important as this one, to
make a final judgment in the absence of a complete record and
where mandatory inferences create critical issues of fact."221
V. CONCLUSION
The majority's resolution of Maricopa County seems correct
both in terms of the prior related decisions and the economic reali-
ties of the health care industry. In keeping with Goldfarb's rejec-
tion of an implied antitrust exemption for the professions, coupled
with the constricted view of the exemption for the "business of in-
surance," the opinion evidences a judicial commitment toward ap-
plication of antitrust principles to the medical profession. In
particular, the Maricopa County decision illustrates the majority's
skepticism over the cost containment justifications offered in de-
fense of the FMC's and their maximum fee schedules. Such a con-
clusion certainly appears to be well founded in light of the
economic analysis which implies that FMC's are not well suited for
containing costs. 222
Both the Supreme Court dissent and the majority of the court
of appeals argued for rule of reason treatment for the FMC's, based
primarily on the Court's lack of familiarity with the economic
structure of the health care industry. However, the Supreme
Court majority and Judge Larson, dissenting in the court of ap-
peals, have taken the better reasoned approach. Noting the
Court's history of forbidding price fixing, they were seriously con-
cerned about horizontal agreements which had the effect of limit-
ing pricing discretion. Perhaps the best course was Judge Larson's
"truncated" rule of reason, which would condemn the FMC ar-
rangement after only a cursory examination.223
Recognizing what it believed to be the causes and likely cures
for the inflationary trend in health care, the court left itself room
within the law of antitrust to accommodate promising cost contain-
ment efforts in the future. First, Maricopa County should effec-
tively prevent FMC's from undermining the development of the
cost conscious HMO's. This is due to the fact that FMC's will,
deemed per se invalid. And if the district court had found that peti-
tioner had failed to establish a per se violation of the Sherman Act,
the question would have remained whether the plan comports with
rule of reason.
Id. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16
(1978).
221. 102 S. Ct. at 2485 (Powell, J., dissenting).
222. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
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hereafter, be subject to a per se analysis under the antitrust laws
when they fix prices. Second, the majority in Maricopa County
recognized that private arrangements in which individual insurers
contract with individual doctors to contain costs might well be le-
gal.2 24 Finally, the Court, using the logic of Broadcast Music, em-
phasized that the closed-panel HMO's-perhaps the best cost
containers-would not be within the reach of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.225 Viewed in this light, the Court has demonstrated its
- commitment to extending antitrust principles to the health care
profession in order to promote effective cost containment.
224. 102 S. Ct. at 2477-78 & n.26. This question was not reached in Royal Drug. See
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., Inc., 440 U.S. 205, 210 n.5
(1979).
225. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
1983]
